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CASES NOTED
pliance with existing laws.' 5 When a will or any part thereof is open
to two interpretations, one of which is illegal or invalid, the valid inter-
pretation should be adopted as expressive of the true testamentary intent. 6
The court in interpreting a will should indulge every legal presumption
in favor of validity of the will. 17
As the courts, wherever possible, should presume that the testator
intended to comply with the law, rather than to break it, it is felt that
the will should have been given effect so long as the son was not
incapacitated.
PnmuP W. KNIGHT
WITNESSES-EXCLUSION FROM COURTROOM WHILE
OTHERS TESTIFY
A trial judge refused to excuse appellant's witness, a psychiatrist, from
the rule excluding a witness from the court room while others are testifying.
Held, the discretion of a trial judge governs those witnesses who are to be
excused f'om this rule, and his decision will not be reversed unless it
is prejudicial to the party complaining. McVeigh v. State, 73 So.2d 694
(Fla. 1954).
The separation of witnesses, for the purpose of exposing inconsistencies
in their testimony, has long been practiced. Like most of our jurisprudence
it is said to descend from the common law of England but its inception
is indeed much older.' Though brought to America by that medium, the
first report of separating witnesses in a trial is recorded in the book of
15. Cleveland Clinic Foundation v. Humphries, 97 F.2d 849, 855 (6th Cir.
1938) (". . . the golden rule of interpretation is the intent of the testator which should
be made to conform to the rules of law which it is presumed the testator knew and
considered when drafting his wil.") Cf. In re Nugen's Estate, 223 Iowa 428, 272 N.W.
239 (1937)(A gift to farm a charitable library with reference to administration duties
which were in conflict with statutory regulations was upheld, the gift being subjected
to the statute); In re Griffin's Vill, 159 Misc. 12, 287 N.Y.Supp. 514 (Surr. Ct.
1936) (Existing laws held incorporated into wills as into every other document).
16. Fussey v. White, 113 Ill. Rep. 637 (18851; Rotch v. Emerson, 105 Mass.
431, 433 (1870); Oennett v. Dennett, 40 N.H. 498, 500 (1860); Coon v. Coon. 38
Misc. 693, 78 N.Y.Supp. 245 (1902); Post v. Hoover, 33 N.Y.Supp. 593 (Ct. of
App. 1865); Atkinson v. Hutchinson, 3 P. Wims. 258, 260 (Eng. 1734):
"Where words are capable of a twofold construction even in the case
of a deed (and much more of a will), it is just and reasonable that such
construction should be received as tends to make it good.
17. Cartinhour v. Houser, 66 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1953).
18. Hooper v. Stokes, 107 Fla. 607, 145 So. 855 (1933) (Testator's express intent
will determine the interpretation of a will, though the will is harsh and unnatural);
Vanroy v. Hoover, 96 Fla. 194, 117 So. 887 (1928); Newman v. Smith, 77 Fla. 633,
82 So. 236 (1918); Eberlin v. Brunner, 233 Mo. App. 563, 123 S.W.2d 543 (1939);
In re Bose's Estate, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 (1939).
1. TRIBBLE, FLA. EVIDENCE § 4757, p. 1061.
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
the Apocryphol.2  The story of Daniel's judgment in Susanna's case has
given to this expedient a unique and classical place in our law as well
as in our literature."  The primary object of the separation of witnesses
is to prevent witnesses from hearing the testimony of other witnesses and
concocting evidence in support of, or contradictory to, each other. 4 The
practice of keeping witnesses from the court room in both civil and
criminal cases has an early history in the United States. " However, there
does exist a difference of judicial opinion as to whether separation is
demandable as a right6 or at the trial court's discretion.7  The great
majority of courts follow the early English doctrine8 in holding that it is
within the discretion of the trial court,9 although motions for exclusion
are rarely denied in criminal cases,10 especially in trial for a felony. Under
the majority rule a motion to exclude witnesses in a civil case need not
be granted where no practical reason for the motion exists or is alleged.'
It appears that the motion to keep the witnesses apart from the court
room in criminal cases is more a matter of right and when sought is
practically always granted, while in civil cases it is more discretionary.
The parties demanding removal may not as of right insist upon the court
2. History of Susanna, verses 51-64; 6 WirGmoR, Evi'NcE § 1837 (3d ed. 1940);
\VTcNIORE, A KALEIDOSCOPE OF JUSTICE (Washington Law Book Co., 1941), p. 658.
Here is recorded the History of Susanna: "'Iwo elders coveted Susanna, a Matron of
Israel of high degree, and charged her with adultery; and she was brought before the
assembly; and Daniel said: Put these two aside, one from another and I will examine
them.' lhe witnesses were separated, and in their testimony so contradicted each
other that Susanna was vindicated, and from that day forth was Daniel held in great
reputation in the sight of the people."
3. Sir Wdalter Raleigh's Trial, JARDIN. CRu, TR., I, 419 (1603) ("My lords,
for the matter I desire remember too the Story of Susanna; she was falsely accused,
and Daniel called the judges 'Fools, because without examination of the truth they
had condemned a daughter of Israel,' and lie discovered the False witnesses by asking
them questions.")
4. 6 WICMOR,, EVIDENcE § 1839 (3d ed. 1940); I CIIAMBERIAYNE, MODERN
LAw oF EVIDENCE § 189 (1911); 2 BEST, LAw o1 EVIDENCE § 636 (1876); ENcy
OF EVIDENCE 589 (1909); 1 CREENLIEF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 432 (16 cd. 1899).
5. People v. Duffy, 1 Wheeler 123 (N.Y. 1822).
6. Rainwater v. Ehnore, I Heisk 363 (1870) (but the motion must be supported
by affidavit; other states hold the same way by statute but they are mostly magistrates
statutes); cf. V. L. Holcomb Inc. v. City of Clarksdale, 217 Miss. 892, 65 So.2d 281
(1953); accord, State v. Zellers, 7 N.J.L. 224 (1824); Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn.
40, 148 S.W. 543 (1912) (affidavit must be filed stating sufficient grounds for the
rule); Bishop v. State, 81 Tex. Cr. 96, 194 S.W. 389 (1917); See, 3 WICMORE,
EVIENCE. § 1839 (3d ed. 1940).
7. Wilson v. State, 52 Ala. 299 (1875) (the order of exclusion of witnesses may
be made by the court on its own motion, if deemed essential to the discovery of the
truth); accord, McLean v. State, 16 Ala. 672 (1849); Ray v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky.
286, 43 S.W.2d 694 (1931); Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916);
Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. 484, 19 N.W. 607 (1884).
8. Cooks Trial, 13 Flow. St. Tr. 311, 348 (1696).
9. Ill. et. ux. v. U. S., 198 F.2d 112 (9th Cir. 1952); cf. Mitchell v. US., 126
1,.2d 550 (10th Cir. 1942); accord, Gates v. US., 122 F.2d 571 (10th Cir. 1941);
Vance v. State, 56 Ark. 402, 19 S.\V 1066 (1892); cf. Holler v. State, 136 Fla. 880,
187 So. 781 (1939); Cason v. State, 86 Fla. 276, 97 So. 720 (1923); Romano v.
Palazzo, 83 Fla. 243, 91 So. 115 (1922); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Smith, 53 Fla. 375,
43 So. 235 (1907); State v. Jackson, 136 Mo. 1069, 83 S.V.2d 87 (1935); State v,
Compton. 317 Mo. 475, 296 S.W. 137 (1927).
10. Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916).
11. Coonan v. Baltimore 0. R. Co., 25 F. Supp. 834 (D.C. Penn. 1938).
CASES NOTED
including all witnesses in the rule without exception,'12 and frequently the
trial courts sanction the omission of prospective witnesses, whose assistance
in the management of the case is under circumstances indispcnsable.'
In the instant case appellant contended that the trial court erred
by not excusing its expert witness from the rule since there was no dispute
or conflicting testimony as to the facts. And in so doing the witness was
prevented from hearing the testimony in the case so as to better form and
express his opinion as to the sanity of defendant. The decisions' 4 relied
upon by appellant are concerned with the right of an expert witness to
give his opinion when he has heard all the evidence of the case and
there is -no conflicting or disputed testimony. The matter of exempting
or refusing to exempt a witness from the operation of the rule is largely
within the discretion of the trial court' and it is not ground for reversal
unless the discretion is flagrantly abused to the prejudice of the party
complaining.' Furthermore, the action of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless its order was arbitrary and prejudicial.' 7  There is, however,
a small minority of jurisdictions which hold that the discretion of the
trial court in excusing witnesses from the rule, when it is envoked, is not
subject to revision.18 The major part of the decisions which allow a witness
12. 6 WIciooE, EVIDENCE § 1841 (3d ed. 1940).
13. Ryan v. Couch, 66 Ala. 244 (1880); accord, Robinson v. State, 80 Fla. 736,
87 So. 61 (1920); Shaw v. State, 102 Ga. 660, 29 S.E. 477 (1897).
14. Porter v. State, 135 Ala. 51, 33 So. 694 (1903); State v. Privitt, 175 Mo. 207,
75 SAV. 157 (1916) (."h'lie better practice where the facts arc contradicted or are not
entirely clear is to put to the expert a hypothetical question based on the facts claimed
to have been proven, that the jury may know the circumstances on which the opinion
is based"); State v. Hayden, 51 Vt. 296 (1878); State v. Spangler, 92 Wash. 636,
159 Pac. 810 (1916); Cornell v. State, 101 Wis. 527 (1899); 2 WVICMORE EvIDENC'E
§ 418 (10th ed. 1918). § 563 (3rd ed. 1940); 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE-,.
15, McDowell v. State, 238 Ala. 101. 189 So. 183 (1934); cf. Hamrick v. Town
of Albertville, 219 Ala. 465, 122 So. 448 (1929); Brooks v. State. 146 Ala. 153, 41
So. 156 (1906); Roberts v. State, 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238 (1899); Riley v. State,
88 Ala. 193, 7 So. 149 (1889); Vance v. State, 56 Ark. 402, 19 S.W. 1066 (1892);
People v. McClure, 117 Cal. 381, 4 P.2d 211 (1931); People v. McCarty, 117 Cal. 65,
48 Pac. 984 (1897); Platt v. State, 124 Fla. 465, 168 So, 804 (1936); Taylor v. State,
88 Fla. 555, 102 So. 884 (1925); State v. Forbes, 111 La. 473, 35 So. 710 (1903);
Johnston v. Farmer's Fire Ins. Co., 106 Mich. 96, 64 NWNV. 5 (1895); State v. Whitworth,
126 Mo. 573, 29 S.W. 595 (1895); M. A. Cooper and Co. et al. v. Sawyer, 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 620, 73 S.W. 992 (19031.
16. Raarup v. U.S., 23 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1928); c. West v. State, 149 Fla.
436, 6 So.2d 7 (1942); Robinson v. State, 80 Fla. 736, 87 So. 61 (1920); Roberts v.
State, 100 Neb. 199, 158 N.W. 930 (1916); Goldman v. State, 95 S.\V.2d 423 (1936);
Jackson v. Commonwealth. 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E. 452 (1898).
17. Mikel v. State, 182 Ark. 924. 33 S \V.2d 397 (1930); cf. St. Louis Ry. v.
Plate, 90 Ark. 135, 118 S.W. 260 (1909); Glass v. Fulford, 77 Ark. 603, 92 SAV. 862
(1906); Wise et al v. City of Abilene, 141 S.W.2d 403 (1940); accord, Southland
Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Matthews, 130 Tex. 142, 74 SW. 717 (1934); cf. Beaumont
and C. N. R.R. v. Elliot, 148 S.W. 1125 (Tex. 1912); accord, Devlin v. Dept. of
Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 549, 78 P.2d 952 (1938).
18. Hill v. State, 137 Ala. 44, 34 So. 680 (1903); cf. Huskey v. State, 129 Ala.
94, 29 So. 838 (1901); accord, Roberts v. State. 122 Ala. 47, 25 So. 238 (1899); Burks
v. State, 120 Ala. 386, 24 So. 931 (1898); McClellan v. State, 117 Ala. 140, 23 So.
653 (1895); Barnes v. State, 88 Ala. 204, 7 So. 38 (1890); McGuff v. State, 88 Ala.
147, 7 So. 35 (1889).
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
to be excused from the rule do so for the purpose of allowing the witness
to stay in the court room to assist in the trial. 19
The discretion of the trial court must be shown to be arbitrary and
unreasonably cxercised, 20 and it is the duty of the appellant to make
the errors apparent of which he complains,2 1 for a strong presumption exists
in favor of the court as to the proper exercise of its discretionary power.
22
The courts presume that in the administering of that power the trial judge
will exercise it with due regard to the rights of the parties involved.
There is a strong logical basis for the action of the trial court in refusing
to except a witness from this rule. There appears no good reason why
witnesses summoned to testify as experts should be placed upon a higher
plane than other witnesses, especially as to matters upon which they
are called to testify. Let us bear in mind the true purpose of the rule;
namely, that its design is to prevent witnesses from hearing the testimony
of others and concocting evidence in support of, or contradictory to, each
other.23  "The expedient of excluding witnesses from the court room
is one of the greatest engines that the skill of man has ever invented for
the detection of liars in the courts of justice.'
2 4
JAMES J. LiNus
19. Benton v. State, 96 Ala. App. 291, 71 So. 8 (1911) (however it is better
that the witness be first examined); Cathy v. State, 28 Ga. App. 666, 112 S.E. 915
(1922); Mathews Admr's v. Louisville & N. R.R., 130 Ky. 551, 113 S.V. 459 (1908);
State v. Smith, 216 La. 1041, 45 So,2d 617 (1950); cf. Shaw v. State, 102 Ga. 660,
29 S.E. 477 (1897); Meyer v. Renner Co., 109 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio 1951).
20. State v. Barton, 207 La. 820, 22 So.2d 183 (1945) (Exempting a medical
officer, an investigating officer and peace officer from the rule was not an abuse of
discretion, where trial judge stated that such witness testifield only to facts brought
out by their investigation.); accord, Combs v. State, 49 S.W. 585 (Tex. 1899); Jackson
v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 107, 30 S.E. 452 (1898).
21. See note 4, supra.
22. Williams v. Yelvington, 103 Fla. 145, 137 So. 156 (1931); cf. Morasso v.
State, 74 Fla. 269, 76 So. 777 (1917); Falk et al. v. Kimmerle et al., 57 Fla. 70,
49 So. 504 (1909).
23. Morasso v. State, 74 Fla. 269, 76 So. 777 (1917); accord, Huffman v. Com.
monwealth, 185 Va. 524, 29 S.E.2d 291 (1946).
24. Wigmore, Sequestration of Witnesses, 14 Hav. L. REv. 475, 482 (1901).
